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Introduction
Sean Homer, Ruth Parkin-Gounelas
and Yannis Stavrakakis
W hy objects? A title like this is likely to provoke a scatter of asso-ciations, so broad is its range of meanings: material things, artworks, an aim (“the object of the exercise”), philosophy’s an-
tithesis of the subject, the psychological “other,” objects of fetishism, polit-
ical causes. Our aim is to produce new alignments among these different ob-
jects. Through the bringing together of this constellation of meanings, pre-
sented here from a range of different discourses (political theory, psycho-
analysis, philosophy, art, literary and film theory), each of them, we believe,
may shift focus, take on different resonances. If late modernity has been
dominated by the crisis of the subject, the last decade, it seems to us, has
witnessed a dramatic return of the object in new and multiple forms. Samuel
Beckett predicted such a shift as early as the 1970s when he entitled one of
his plays Not I, highlighting the overpowering “dull roar” of thoughts and
words in the skull1 as well as the servitude of these mental objects to a sub-
ject only able to grant them existence in negative terms (not I). 
Many contemporary authors have picked up on Beckett’s prescient in-
sights to explore the way all objects (things, others, words, concepts) only
ever operate in a psychic space. Philosophers have argued that if belief maps
the world, it is desire that targets it by providing us with objectives, things
at which to aim (Wollheim 13). Rooted in desire, objects project both back
and forward: back to the most foundational of human encounters (that of the
infant with its first object of identification), forward to the objects (materi-
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1. “[S]he could still hear the buzzing . . . in the ears . . . dull roar in the skull . . . straining
to hear . . . make something of it . . . and her own thoughts . . . make something of
them . . . all - . . . what? . . . the buzzing? . . . yes . . . something buzzing in the brain
. . . raving away on its own” (Beckett 217-20).
al, aesthetic, erotic) perpetually sought to protect the subject from the im-
possibility of loss. To talk about objects, whether material (“out there”) or
the internal (psychic) objects they are linked to, is thus to broach the most
primitive of all topics, to raise questions of primal confrontations.
As the papers in this volume demonstrate, the conjunction of the cate-
gories in our sub-title (the material, the psychic and the aesthetic) has par-
ticular relevance for a cultural investigation of late modernity. It is a con-
junction also to be found, however, in one of the great texts of early moder-
nity, Shakespeare’s A Midsummer Night’s Dream, a play which incidentally
gestures at the deeper historical roots of its concerns by setting the scene in
ancient Athens. As we all know, Shakespeare’s play is an archetypal explo-
ration of the relations of fantasy and desire. These psychic concerns, how-
ever, are subtly interwoven with their aesthetic and material-political corre-
lates, all of which are laid out in a neat pattern of concentrically-circled,
inter-connected plots, one within the other. In the first, outer layer is the plot
of Theseus, Duke of Athens, and his lavish preparations for marriage with
his rather reluctant betrothed. The second plot gives us two sets of Athenian
lovers, whose role it is to follow the course of true love (which never does
“run smooth”) until the comic resolution. Within these two realistic plots is
the fantasy story of the fairies, Titania and Oberon, who mirror reality’s dis-
satisfactions by crossing each other’s desire at every turn. Finally, embed-
ded within all this, like the kernel in the fruit, is a fourth plot, an unelabo-
rated little ur-play put on by the local artisans to entertain the Duke. A crude
attempt, both in acting and content, it is confined to two small scenes, pre-
sented like single images. In the first, two lovers, separated, whisper through
a chink in a wall, with all the emphasis on the chink, represented by the
character Wall holding up his fingers to form a hole. In the second scene, the
lovers attempt to meet face to face, but after a misunderstanding involving
a lion, end up committing separate suicide.
In this crude little sketch, Shakespeare is making a primitive point
about objects which the elaborations of the outer plots have covered over -
that love is sustained by a hole in a wall, the removal of which spells its end.
The meeting of subject and object is possible only in fantasy. The object can
only be glimpsed through a hole (in fragments) and then fleshed out by fan-
tasy; as a “whole,” it is impossible. The hole and the wall, therefore, have
protected the lovers from the traumatic encounter with the real of loss. 
Many of the essays in this volume circle around the idea demonstrated
in this little play, that culture is the product of a struggle between the too lit-
tle and the too much, between what’s seen only through the chink in the wall
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and what’s experienced when it’s removed. The point to be noted, however,
is that Shakespeare’s play as a whole positions the sketch in such a way as
to emphasize what emerges from this struggle. After the performance, The-
seus announces that in spite of being “palpable-gross,” the play has “well
beguiled / The heavy gait of night” (122) - has provided, in other words, a
charm against the invading forces of darkness. This is the role of cultural ob-
jects: to “beguile.”
Objects also, the play reminds us, lie at the primal intersection of hu-
mans and their environment. The artisans, dubbed by Puck “hempen home-
spuns” (74) and “rude mechanicals, / That work for bread upon Athenian
stalls” (79), sweat and slog to produce their theatrical piece, just as they
do to earn a living. “Hard-handed men,” they’re described by Philostrate, the
smooth Master of Revels, “that work in Athens here, / Which never labored
in their minds till now; / And now have toiled their unbreathed memories /
With this same play” (111). Their play, in fact, is presented as an extension
of their manual working, labouring and toiling, with the vocabularies of
their trades (as carpenter, joiner, bellows mender, tinker, etc.) carried over to
emphasize the point. Nick Bottom the weaver, who plays the lead male
Pyramus in the little play, calls on the Fates to “come, come / Cut thread and
thrum” at his last hour (119). As communal artifact, their play is insepara-
ble from what they make for their physical survival. 
Bottom’s weaving of cultural products recalls Marx’s famous discus-
sion of labour and production in the first volume of Capital. Woven cloth
must be regarded, he argues, as a materialized objectification of bodily
labour: “Yarn with which we neither weave nor knit is cotton wasted” (289).
Living labour “awaken[s things] from the dead, change[s] them from mere-
ly possible into real and effective use-value” (289). Through labour, things
are “infused with vital energy” for the performance of their functions (289).
By setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, in order to appropriate
the materials of nature, human beings are acting on and changing the exter-
nal world, and at the same time changing their own nature (283). Through
these projections and introjections, we could say, all objects, both material
and cultural, function at the crucial point of intersection of humans and their
environment. At the same time, all objects, whether material or immaterial,
acquire desirable metonymic status through their implication in a complex
dialectic of desire that can be formally delineated without reference to their
substantive content. A commodity, as Yannis Stavrakakis reminds us in his
essay in this volume, is defined by Marx at the beginning of Capital as “an
external object, a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of
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whatever kind” (Marx 125). Crucially, however, “[t]he nature of these
needs, whether they arise, for example, from the stomach or the imagina-
tion, makes no difference” (125). 
This plasticity (of the drive) came to function as a cornerstone for the
Freudian and Lacanian theorizations of the object. Absent cause of desire,
object of the drive, both lure and obstacle, simultaneously lack and excess,
the Freudian-Lacanian object sheds light on a variety of social attachments
and hegemonic orders. Dave Lewis offers here a concise presentation of the
way this particular object functions in Freud and Lacan’s theorizations of
the drive, using as an illustration Zola’s Thérèse Raquin. Calum Neill dis-
cusses its place within fantasy - providing, incidentally, another theoretical
model for the reading of the role of fantasy in A Midsummer Night’s Dream.
Yannis Stavrakakis employs the same Lacanian orientation in his analysis of
advertising and consumerism, an approach made possible by the homology
between Marx’s surplus-value and Lacan’s notion of surplus-enjoyment, lo-
cated at the heart of the latter’s problematic of the object (Lacan, Séminaire
XVII 19). If Marx was eventually to proceed in a different direction,2 con-
temporary political theory has restored to central position the
impossible/necessary object - embodying an ultimately unachievable full-
ness - in social and political life. Ernesto Laclau, for example, has repeat-
edly insisted on the deep connection between the desire for fullness inform-
ing the hegemonic relation - “making a [partial] object the embodiment of a
mythical fullness” (115) - and the object of psychoanalysis. We are dealing,
he argues, “not with casual or external homologies but with the same dis-
covery taking place from two different angles - psychoanalysis and politics
- of something that concerns the very structure of objectivity . . . The logic
of the objet petit a and the hegemonic logic are not just similar: they are
simply identical” (116).
It has long been recognized that it is through the fetishism of the object
that Marx meets Freud, a synthesis proposed by the earlier generation of
Frankfurt theorists (Adorno, “Sociology and Psychology” 67-80).3 Whether
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2. Slavoj ÎiÏek’s view is that Marx went on to disavow the paradoxical status of desire
in favour of a “vulgar evolutionist dialectics of productive forces and the relation of
production” (53).
3. For Adorno the structure of fetishism provides the pivotal mediation between capi-
talist production and the individual psyche in the sense that every psychological sat-
isfaction depends on the social substitution of exchange value in the place of use val-
ue (“On the Fetish-Character” 279). Sexual and economic fetishism, he argues, are
essentially the same thing; indeed, he goes as far as to argue that commodity
or not we should be talking about some sort of “identity” (as Laclau would
have it) between psychoanalytic and political concepts of the object, how-
ever, is a matter of considerable debate - not least among the authors of this
Introduction. The counter-argument runs something like this. For Marx, the
value of a commodity resides not in its utility but in the amount of labour time
required to produce it, a quality realised only through its exchange. But in the
process of exchange, a social relation between producers takes on the appear-
ance of an objective relation between things (products). This is what brings
about the mystification of the commodity form - the transformation of a so-
cial relation among producers into a relation among objects. As with Freud,
fetishism for Marx “arises from the form itself” (Marx 164). In contrast to
psychoanalysis, therefore, where the focus is on the investment of excessive
value in the object, Marxism is concerned with the failure of the “real” value
of the object to be inscribed upon it, as well as with the process through which
the phantasmatic value of exchange comes to be established in its place. 
It would be facile to attempt a resolution of this fundamental difference
over the question of the inscription of value upon the object. Rather more a-
greement, however, can be reached about the way that Marxism, psycho-
analysis and contemporary political theory distance themselves (albeit in
rather different ways) from postmodern reflections on the status of the ob-
ject in the hyperreal world of late capitalism (Jameson 1-54). Within post-
modernist theory, the object is eclipsed by representation, is drained of ma-
teriality - as is evident in Jean Baudrillard’s early critique of Marxian polit-
ical economy and Saussurean linguistics. According to Baudrillard, writing
in 1968, consumption should not be analysed as a material practice. Rather,
it is a signifying structure, “an activity consisting of the systematic manipu-
lation of signs” (The System of Objects 200). To illustrate this, Baudrillard
gives his well-known analysis of the objects in a room described in Georges
Perec’s novel Les choses. These lush consumer items (“sign-objects”), he
contends, are laden with references to each other, defined in terms of their
difference from each other, like arbitrary signifiers, and bear no trace of
their symbolic value, their relation to humans - as they would, say, in a nov-
el by Balzac. For Baudrillard, therefore, the only way to move beyond a po-
litical economy grounded in need and to understand the commodity struc-
ture of consumer society is to argue that there is no longer use value as such,
only exchange value. 
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fetishism in the field of art finds its “exact correlative” in the psychological econo-
my of the self (Aesthetic Theory 13). 
Baudrillard insists that the arbitrariness of the sign resides not in the re-
lationship between the signifier and the referent (object) but rather within the
sign itself, between the signifier and the signified. Just as Baudrillard came
to see use value as merely a projection of exchange value, he now argued
(and here he went one step further than Lacan, who had sought to retain some
role for the subject which was not wholly determined by language) that the
referent is no more external to the sign than is the signified; both are internal
to it, the referent/object being a projection of the sign itself. That is to say,
what we are left with is not “reality” but a mere reality effect. Thus Bau-
drillard avoids the metaphysical illusion of a separation between the sign and
the real, as the real-in-itself does not exist as an independent concrete reality
but only as “the extrapolation of the excision (decoupage) established by the
logic of the sign onto the world of things (onto the phenomenological uni-
verse of perception)” (“For a Critique” 87). The hyperreal world of consumer
society and postmodernism, this volume attempts at several points to argue,
makes the fundamental mistake of collapsing the real into the symbolic and
thus abolishing the object completely. Although the capitalist utopia is pre-
dominantly a virtual utopia, as Stavrakakis puts it, the symbolic conditioning
of desire cannot function without a real support (this volume 94, 96).
At first sight there might appear to be much in common between post-
modernism and the perspective of Lacanian psychoanalysis developed in a
number of the articles here. Certainly, the object of representation for psy-
choanalysis is always absent, its meaning not pre-given but constituted in
the process of representation itself. But this by no means implies that the ob-
ject is merely the effect of the symbolic. The object of psychoanalysis is a
much more complex and ambiguous affair than this. As Themistoklis Ka-
trios argues here, Freud’s late definition of childhood trauma (what
“make[s] the most powerful contributions to the stamping of character” [this
volume 76]) is that which is never remembered or repeated, and thus never
enters the dynamics of representation. This not-repressed, Katrios argues,
unapproachable by interpretation, makes its presence felt in the analytic situ-
ation as something missing, “a void in the network of representations” (78). 
The notion of repression, key to the understanding of the unconscious,
has been highly contentious in recent debates within psychoanalysis. The
“essence of the process of repression,” wrote Freud, “lies, not in . . . annihi-
lating the idea which represents an instinct [drive], but in preventing it from
becoming conscious” (167). It is through the first act of primal repression,
in fact, that the unconscious comes into being. The notion of repression
therefore draws together the two essential characteristics of the psyche for
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Freud, that is, that the unconscious consists of “ideas” or “representations,”
and that these are linked to the drives. To designate the registration of the
drives in the psyche, Freud coined the neologism Repräsentanz or “psychi-
cal representative.” As Paul Ricoeur puts it, in spite of the barrier separating
the systems unconscious and conscious, there is something that links them,
a “common structure [which] is precisely the function of Repräsentanz”
(135). For Freud, then, the unconscious is representation in that it contains
memory traces of past traumas and experiences; it is the psychical repre-
sentative of the drives. 
The difficulty with Freud’s formulation is that it compounds Repräsen-
tanz - the psychical representative or expression - and Vorstellung - repre-
sentation.4 Lacan, for his part, insists on maintaining the separation of these
two terms and on the need to acknowledge that they refer to two distinct lev-
els of signification. Representation refers to an idea, and as ideas operate at
the level of thought, thus to the level of the signifier. Vorstellung, on the oth-
er hand, refers to that which is represented by signifiers but not the signi-
fiers themselves. Vorstellung is a real presence that can never be rendered
into words or images, and therefore operates at the level of the unthinkable,
the unnameable, the unspeakable (Fink 227). Freud had shown in The In-
terpretations of Dreams that the complex significations that constitute the
dream are in fact the disguised representations of an unconscious wish or
desire. The desire itself is not directly present, but must be deciphered from
the various signifiers of the dream. At the same time, however, there is an
impenetrable core to the dream, the navel of the dream, which he saw as be-
ing uninterpretable. This is what Lacan sees as Vorstellung, that which is
missing in the symbolic and returns in the real. There is always a core of the
real that is missing; all other representations are no more than attempts to
fill that gap. In this sense Vorstellung designates the original lost object or
das Ding (in Lacan’s later formulations the objet petit a, the object-cause of
desire), the implications of which are explored by Sean Homer in his paper
on filmic representations of the Roma. Challenging the critical reception of
films by Roma directors that emphasises their representational authenticity
and truth status, Homer shows how Tony Gatlif’s acclaimed film Gadjo di-
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4. The compound term used by Freud was Vorstellungsrepräsentanz (ideational repre-
sentative) (179). Vorstellung is generally translated into English as “idea” but can al-
so be translated as “representation.” All mental states, therefore, are either ideas or
ideas plus affect. But whereas Freud speaks of unconscious ideas, unconscious rep-
resentations, there can “strictly speaking” be no unconscious affects (179). Repres-
sion severs the original idea, representation, from its affect.
lo (1997) problematises the issue of representing the Roma. In advanced
consumer societies the subject is increasingly driven by a desire to experi-
ence the real, a moment of authenticity, but is condemned, like Gatlif’s
crazy stranger, to return repetitively to the site of an absence “in the hope of
obtaining the real Thing, and yet forever missing it” (Fink 228).
But what, after all, about subjects? In focusing on how objects are used
to make meaning and shape fantasy, are we not simply shifting the terms
around? Several papers in this volume would suggest otherwise. In his re-
reading of Hegel, Slavoj ÎiÏek calls for a new and radical displacement of
the Kantian subject as actively synthesizing (conferring meaning on) con-
tent. The Hegelian subject as cleansed substance (Lacan’s $) is thus not the
agent but the site of deployment of the object’s potential, of the object/Sys-
tem’s “autopoetic self-organization” (this volume 24). This new formulation
has nothing to do with a mega-subject controlling the dialectical process,
but on the contrary, at its most radical, allows for the emergence of a “pure
subject qua void” (26). Within the terms of late modernity’s culture of con-
sumption, Hegel’s (and ÎiÏek’s) digestive metaphor seems more relevant
than ever. What it allows, ÎiÏek argues, is that we “turn around” the stan-
dard critical reading of the Hegelian Substance-Subject as thoroughly con-
stipated (retaining the swallowed content) and let the object drop. Such a
Hegelian move allows for the timely release of the other from the self, of
nature-as-object from the voracity of human appropriations. To “let nature
go,” therefore, may be our greatest potential. “The supreme moment of the
subject’s freedom,” as ÎiÏek puts it here , “is to set free its object” (24).
In similar terms, Simon Critchley takes a stand here (through the poet-
ry of Fernando Pessoa and Wallace Stevens) against the subject’s obfusca-
tions and mystifications of our relation to objects and argues for the need to
see things as they seem, without “meaning.” Poetry, he writes here, “pro-
duces felt variations in the appearances of things that return us to the un-
derstanding of things that we endlessly pass over in our desire for knowl-
edge” (122). Of all art forms, it was perhaps the still life painting which
drew attention to the release of nature from subjective appropriations. “Is
this not,” ÎiÏek asks in this regard, “the very definition of the birth of mod-
ern art proper, [that it should be] no longer subordinated to the task of rep-
resenting spiritual reality” (this volume 23)? Following a similar trajectory,
Sylvia Karastathi explores the way still life paintings of the Dutch School
destabilize hierarchies between subjects and objects, drawing attention to
the ousting of the human subject from the centre by the mass of things that
impinge upon it. Peter Greenaway, she continues, gives this early modern
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point a postmodern twist by situating his films in the cross-fire of debate be-
tween an allegorical (iconographic) reading of material objects, and its re-
fusal - an insistence on the paintings (and his own filmic objects) as pure vi-
sual surface. Indeed, the implication seems to be, these two seemingly anti-
thetical arguments are in fact part of the same phenomenon. As pure surface,
objects that refuse our constant striving towards figuration, that cannot be co-
opted in the service of the subject’s self-consciousness, only serve to remind
us of our own otherness to ourselves. From a similar angle in her essay on
contemporary Iranian cinema, Joan Copjec argues that what causes anxiety
and shame is the experience not of loss, but of there being an “unassumable
object which sticks to us like a semi-autonomous shadow” (this volume 173).
Shame “exposes the unobjectificable object which decenters me from my-
self” (180).
Another way of viewing this shift is provided by theories of the object
in post-Kleinian psychoanalysis, a point underlying the papers by Jacobus,
Parkin-Gounelas and Katrios. Psychology and philosophy have long since
recognized that all perception is apperception, that the object which escapes
mental or psychic investment is a contradiction in terms. But as Ruth
Parkin-Gounelas points out, much recent Kleinian theory has helped us un-
derstand the way psychoanalysis has focused too much on the projective us-
es of objects. Christopher Bollas, for example, has called for the need to un-
derstand the “evocative integrity” of internal objects, their ability to “struc-
ture us differently.” It is this power that lies at the root of aesthetic experi-
ence, a moment of psychic intensity in which, according to Bollas and oth-
ers such as Meg Harris Williams, it is the subject which experiences a sense
of being “used” by (internal) objects - very much as poets have traditional-
ly felt themselves under the control of the Muse (Parkin-Gounelas, this vol-
ume 147-48). Like other recent object-relations theorists, Bollas is referring
not to some stable or knowable object of fixed identifications, but rather to
operations within a psychic space which is always already inter-personal or
other-directed, in a complex dialectic of the real and the phantasmatic. In
this respect, it could be argued, our understanding of their work has brought
Kleinian and Lacanian theory closer today than ever before.
In a different but related vein, many of the essays here follow a phe-
nomenological view of the life-world’s organic agency. Husserl’s challenge
to Kant on the subject’s access to objects echoes throughout these pages - in
Peter Costello’s descriptions of the mutual interpretations of people and ob-
jects, in Ruth Parkin-Gounelas’s return to Heidegger’s (and Lacan’s) de-
scriptions of the jug, and in Mary Jacobus’s musings, via Merleau-Ponty, on
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the way clouds challenge the phenomenology of the visible. Like several
other essays in the volume which are concerned with the representation of
the visible and the spatial, Jacobus turns to recent theories of painting, in
this case those of Hubert Damisch, which emphasize the way painting com-
bines the material and the ephemeral, moves from representation to illusion.
For Constable, she argues, clouds provided an opportunity to reflect on fun-
damental problems of space, depth and form, as well as to offer a “language
for inner activity” (this volume 223).
Over the last decade, objects have demonstrated a new resilience or de-
fiance, repudiating their status (as Jina Politi clarifies here) as “mytheme[s]
of Origins” (133), demanding a different distribution of the visible and in-
visible, and parading their “unobjectifiability,” to use the terms of Joan Cop-
jec’s argument. In the autumn of 2001, a special issue of Critical Inquiry
was dedicated to what its guest editor Bill Brown calls “thing theory,” which
examines material culture and its representations, in particular in relation to
the Modernist aesthetic.5 Our volume carries forward this project (and that
of others such as Arjun Appadurai in his influential volume on The Social
Life of Things [1986])6 through a more specifically focused preoccupation
with objects rather than things, the products of labour and creativity, of sen-
sation and cognition, of phantasmatic investment. Confronting the absence
of cherished concepts of interiority, the impossibility of self-consciousness,
the late modern subject is coming to terms with the experience of self-
objectification - a condition, in the final analysis, beyond the terms of the
debate over whether objects are constituted by or constitutive of subjects.
Poised as it is upon the paradox of the phantasmatic real, of immaterial ma-
teriality, late-capitalist globalized culture confronts us with an aporia.
Through its capacity to enchant, channelling desire in very specific direc-
tions, contemporary consumer culture has effected a significant shift in the
way the social bond is structured. It is this enchantment which constitutes its
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5. Much of Brown’s work, as well as that of others like Douglas Mao (Solid Objects,
1998), has centred on authors such as Woolf, Henry James, Pound and Stevens, and
on Modernism’s emphasis on “how inanimate objects constitute human subjects”
(Brown, “Thing Theory” 7). An early example of Brown’s work was his essay on
“The Secret Life of Things (Virginia Woolf and the Matter of Modernism)” (1999).
A more recent volume is his A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Lit-
erature (2003), which gives a useful list of publications in this field over the past cou-
ple of decades (190-91n16).
6. For an assessment of Appadurai’s work, see the review essay by Karin Boklund-
Lagopoulou in this volume. 
power. The dilemma, therefore, is how to de-mystify the lure of objects, re-
main alert to their possible insidious manipulations, and deflate their fan-
tasmatic promise of fullness, without renouncing the partial drive - how, that
is, to sublimate the struggle between excess and lack, whose beguilement
constitutes the very fabric of our humanity.
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